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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
David Aaron Knutsen appeals from his convictions for sexual abuse of a
vulnerable adult.

This reply brief is necessary to address a disputed factual point,

explain that certain errors are ripe for review, and to address a recently published
opinion involving the vulnerable adult statute.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Knutsen's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but
are incorporated herein by reference thereto. However, to the extent that the State has
inferred that, at the time of the alleged incident, V.M. was already living a specialized
care facility, that inference is not accurate.
The State claims, "V.M. was living in an intensive Care Facility for the Mentally
Retarded." (Appellant's Brief, p.1.) However, a complete review of the record reveals
that V.M. was living with her parents and brother at the time of the grand jury indictment
which was approximately ten months after the alleged incident. (Grand Jury Tr., p.83,
Ls.23-24; R., pp.12-14.) After V.M.'s release from Canyon View mental health facility,
she moved to the Emerald House Assisted Living. (Tr., p.401, L.23-p.402, L.7.) The
record does not indicate that V.M. was living at an intensive care facility prior to her
admission to Canyon View.
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ISSUES
1)

Did the court lack subject matter jurisdiction because the Grand Jury's term
expired rendering the indictment issued void?

2)

Is Idaho's sexual abuse of a vulnerable adult statute unconstitutional because it
is overbroad?

3)

Does the application of Idaho's sexual contact with a vulnerable adult statute to
private, consensual sexual relations between consenting adults violate
Mr. Knutsen's right to due process of law and equal protection?

4)

Is Idaho's sexual abuse of a vulnerable adult statute unconstitutionally void for
vagueness in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution?

5)

Did the district court err when it instructed the jury that V.M.'s consent to sexual
contact was not a defense to the crime of sexual abuse of a vulnerable adult?

6)

Should this Court vacate Mr. Knutsen's convictions for sexual abuse of a
vulnerable adult because there was insufficient evidence to support the
convictions?

7)

Should this Cowi vacate three of the convictions of sexual abuse of a vulnerable
adult because Mr. Knutsen's protection against double punishment under the
double jeopardy clauses of the United States and Idaho Constitutions was
violated, because he was charged and convicted of four counts of sexual abuse
of a vulnerable adult where his actions amounted to one continuous act, without
a break in the chain of events, such that he should only be punished for one
offense?
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ARGUMENT
I.
The Court Lacked Subject Matter Jurisdiction Because The Grand Jury's Term Expired
Rendering The Indictment Issued Void
Mr. Knutsen contends a valid Indictment was never entered against him, and
therefore, the district court never had subject matter jurisdiction over his case under
Article I, section 8 of the Idaho Constitution.

He asserts that the district court erred

when it denied his motion to dismiss the invalid indictment. The State argued in its brief
that Mr. Knutsen failed to challenge the district court's holding that it orally ordered the
grand jury to meet on March 25, 2009.

(Respondent's Brief, p.8.) Additionally, the

State argued that the grand jury did not convene until December 3, 2008, and because
the grand jury indicted Mr. Knutsen within the six-month statutory period, the district
court properly acquired jurisdiction. (Respondent's Brief, pp.8-10.)
The State fails to understand Mr. Knutsen's argument

Mr. Knutsen contends

that the district court shortened the period of time that the chosen grand jury had
jurisdiction to act. The order controls the period that the grand jury has authority to act.
While it is true that, by statute, a grand jury may act for six months and the indictment
was issued within the six months, the district court had shortened the grand jury's
jurisdiction to four months.

Therefore, unless there was a court order extending the

grand jury's jurisdiction, it had no authority to act.
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Ii.
Idaho's Sexual Abuse Of A Vulnerable Adult Statute Is Unconstitutional Because It Is
Overbroad
Mr. Knutsen asserts that the sexual abuse of a vulnerable adult statute is
overbroad because it infringes on the constitutionally protected privacy and freedom of
association rights of consenting adults to engage in sexual contact.

Because the

State's argument concerning the overbreadth argument is not remarkable, no further
reply is necessary. Accordingly, Mr. Knutsen simply refers the Court to pages 13-26 of
his Appellant's Brief.

111.
The Application Of Idaho's Sexual Contact With A Vulnerable Adult Statute To Private,
Consensual Sexual Relations Between Consenting Adults Violates Mr. Knutsen's Right
To Due Process Of Law And Equal Protection
Mr. Knutsen asserts that Idaho's sexual contact with a vulnerable adult statute
(I.C. § 18-1505B) is unconstitutional for violating substantive due process and equal
protection.

The State recognizes that Mr. Knutsen did raise the issues before the

district court; however, it contends that the district court failed to make an adverse ruling
and Mr. Knutsen failed to further object to not having an adverse ruling on the matter.
(Respondent's Brief, p.17.)

As mentioned in Mr. Knutsen's opening brief, the State

argued to the district court the statute's legitimate state interest and that the interest did
not infringe on any protected interest of another or violate substantive due process.

(See Appellant's Brief, p.28.)
constitutional, and therefore,

Moreover, the district court found the statute
Mr. Knutsen asserts there is an adverse ruling.

(R., pp.183-199.)
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Even if the State was correct, that Mr. Knutsen failed to object to the scope of the
district court's ruling on his motion or request clarification or reconsideration
(Respondent's Brief, p.17), this Court should still review the issue because he did object
to the error, this Court's review is de novo, and the error is reviewable under the
fundamental error test announced by this court in State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010).
Alternatively, Mr. Knutsen would not object to a remand for the court's determination of
whether the statute violates Mr. Knutsen's due process and equal protection rights.
The Idaho Supreme Court has clarified fundamental error and stated that to
obtain relief on appeal for fundamental error:
(1)
the defendant must demonstrate that one or more of the
defendant's unwaived constitutional rigr1ts were violated; (2) the error must
be clear or obvious, without the need for any additional information not
contained in the appellate record, including information as to whether the
failure to object was a tactical decision; and (3) the defendant must
demonstrate that the error affected the defendant's substantial rights,
meaning (in most instances) that it must have affected the outcome of the
trial proceedings.
Perry, 150 Idaho at 226 (footnote omitted). Thus, on a claim of fundamental error, a
defendant must first show that the alleged error "violates one or more of the defendant's
unwaived constitutional rights" and that the error "plainly exists," in that the error was
plain, clear, or obvious. Id. at 228. If the alleged error satisfies the first two elements of
the Perry test, the error is reviewable.

Id.

To obtain appellate relief, however, the

defendant must further persuade the reviewing court that the error was not harmless,
i.e., that there is a reasonable possibility that the error affected the outcome of the trial.
Id. at 226-228. Mr. Knutsen's claim is that the statute violates his constitutional rights to
due process of law and equal protection, the error plainly exists, and if the statute is
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deemed unconstitutional, Mr. Knutsen's conviction must be vacated. Therefore, under
Perry, this Court should review the constitutionality of the statute.
Recently the Idaho Court of Appeals recognized that the vulnerable adult statute
may violate the Due Process Clause. State v. Hamlin, 156 Idaho 307,
1

P.3d

, 1014 (2014). In Hamlin, the defendant did not receive relief from the potentially

unconstitutional statute because he did not take his case to trial and was unable to
demonstrate, through a pretrial motion to dismiss, that the statute violated due process
as applied to him. Id. at __ , 324 P.3d at 1015. Here, the case did proceed to trial and
the evidence revealed that V.M. verbally consented to sexual contact. 1 The
that the conduct here was not private. (Respondent's Brief, p.1

also

) Assuming for

of argument that the conduct was not private, but consensual, Mr. Knutsen would
guilty of a different code section, such as Idaho Code § 18-4104 (a misdemeanor).
Because the State's remaining arguments regarding due process and equal
protection are not remarkable, no further reply is necessary. Accordingly, Mr. Knutsen
simply refers the Court to pages 27-30 of his Appellant's Brief.

IV.
Idaho's Sexual Abuse Of A Vulnerable Adult Statute Is Unconstitutionally Void For
Vagueness In Violation Of The Fourteenth Amendment Of The United States
Constitution
Mr. Knutsen contends that the statue under which he was prosecuted is
unconstitutionally vague because it fails both to provide fair notice of the prohibited

There is an error in the jury instructions through which this jury was prohibited from
determining whether V.M. consented to sexual contact. The jury instruction issue is
contained in Issue Vin the Appellant's Brief and in this Reply Brief.
1
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conduct and fails to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. The State simply
quotes the language defining "vulnerable adult" and declares the language "broad" but
not vague.

(Respondent's Brief, pp.12-13.)

Contrary to the State's assertion,

Mr. Knutsen does contend that the language is vague. In an attempt to explain how it is
vague, Mr. Knutsen utilizes the facts of this case and hypothetical scenarios. The State
also argues that the statute is not vague as applied. (Respondent's Brief, pp.15-16.) In
its argument, the State focuses on I.C. § 18-1505, the general section prohibiting sexual
contact with vulnerable adults, not the problematic I.C. § 18-1505, the statute that
defines who is vulnerable.

(Respondent's Brief, pp.16.)

VVith that distinction, the

State's response is not remarkable, and no further reply is necessary.

Accordingly,

Mr. Knutsen simply refers the Court to pages 30-43 of his Appellant's Brief.

V.

The District Court Erred When It Instructed The Jury That V.M.'s Consent To Sexual
Contact Was Not A Defense To The Crime Of Sexual Abuse Of A Vulnerable Adult
Mr. Knutsen asserts that the district court should not have provided the consent
defense instruction, or alternatively should have utilized the consent instruction
applicable to rape involving a person of unsound mind.

Because the jury was

incorrectly instructed, the matter should be remanded for a new jury trial with proper
instructions.
Recently, in Hamlin, the Court of Appeals recognized part of the problem with the
vulnerable adult statute. The Hamlin Court stated, "a person deemed to lack capacity in
one area of functioning will not necessarily lack capacity in other areas. Thus, not all
'vulnerable adults' or, as is relevant here, all mentally retarded adults, are incapable of
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validly consenting to sexual behavior." Id. at _, 324 P.3d at 1014. Therefore, when
the court instructed the jury that "it is not a defense to the crime of Sexual Abuse of a
Vulnerable Adult that V.M. may have consented to the alleged conduct" it misstated the
law because a vulnerable person may actually be able to consent to sexual intercourse.
The Hamlin Court went on to find that when an "individual who is a 'vulnerable adult' for
some purposes is nevertheless capable of consenting to sex and does consent to sex in
a private place, that conduct is protected by the Due Process Clause and may not be
criminalized."

Id.

Because the State's argument concerning the inappropriate

instruction is not remarkable, no further reply is necessary. Accordingly, Mr. Knutsen
simply refers the Court to pages 44-48 of his Appellant's Brief.

VI.
This Court Should Vacate Mr. Knutsen's Convictions For Sexual Abuse Of A Vulnerable
Adult As There Was Insufficient Evidence To Support The Convictions Because The
State Failed To Prove That V.M. Was A Vulnerable Adult
Mr. Knutsen asserts that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to
support the jury's guilty verdicts.

Because the State's argument concerning the

sufficiency of the evidence is not remarkable, no further reply is necessary.
Accordingly, Mr. Knutsen simply refers the Court to pages 49-52 of his Appellant's Brief.
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VII.
Mr. Knutsen's Protection Against Double Punishment Under The Double Jeopardy
Clauses Of The United States And Idaho Constitutions Was Violated Because He Was
Charged And Convicted Of Four Counts Of Sexual Abuse Of A Vulnerable Adult Where
His Actions Amounted To One Continuous Act, Without A Break In The Chain Of
Events, Such That He Should Only Be Punished For One Offense
r. Knutsen was

with, and convicted of, four counts of sexual

of a

vulnerable adult despite the fact that the conduct was one continuous act, without a
break in the chain of events. Because I.C. § 18-15058 contemplates a continuing act,
Mr. Knutsen's protection against double punishment under the double jeopardy clauses
of the United States and Idaho Constitution were violated.

Because the State's

argument concerning double jeopardy is not remarkable, no further reply is
Accordingly, Mr. Knutsen simply

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, as well as those set forth in his Appellant's Brief,
Mr. Knutsen respectfully requests that this Court grant him relief consistent with the
claims of error he has asserted in this appeal.
DATED this 23 rd day of June, 2014.

/1
;I
I/?"'

/J~
1

/ ~ «flt / ~---

01ANE M. WALKE

_",,------~

Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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